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Abstract 
 
It is generally agreed that there is a distinction between two kinds of representations of space 
and time. Perspectival or egocentric representations are viewpoint-dependent in the sense that 
the way spatial and temporal positions and relations are represented is relative to one’s own 
position in space or time. In contrast, objective representations are independent of one’s 
position in space or time and thus viewpoint-invariant. For instance, I may represent event A 
as past or as more past than event B (perspectival representations of temporal position and 
temporal relation, respectively) or I may represent event A as occurring on September 11, 
2001 and as earlier then event B (objective representations of temporal location and temporal 
relation, respectively). And similarly for spatial positions and relations.  
One contentious issue, however, is whether perspectival and objective representations are 
independent or whether representations of one kind are constructed, at least in part, from 
representations of the other kind. One further issue is whether the analogy between space and 
time is strong enough that the answer given to the previous question in the case of space, say, 
should also hold for time, or vice-versa. 
The notion of dependence can be understood in several ways and the dependence or 
independence claims can be given stronger and weaker readings. I try to disentangle these 
various readings and to sketch their relations. I also offer detailed characterizations of  the 
distinction between egocentric and objective representations, first in the case of space  and 
then in the case of time.  
I examine how the different versions of the dependence/independence claims fare with respect 
to time and to space. I argue that for two of these claims the analogy between space and time 
breaks down. I propose that the reasons why the analogy is disrupted have to do with certain 
fundamental differences in the way we egocentrically apprehend temporal and spatial 
properties. 
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 0. Introduction 
I am not concerned here with the question of the nature of space and time as exemplified for 
instance in the Leibniz-Newton debate over their relational or absolute nature or in the more 
recent debates surrounding the status of space and time or space-time in contemporary 
physics. My concern is rather with our ways of thinking about or representing spatial and 
temporal locations and relations. I am therefore primarily interested in epistemic and semantic 
rather than metaphysical issues. I will try to remain neutral as to whether and to what extent if 
any a study of the way the mind apprehends spatial and temporal properties can shed light on 
the nature of space and time and hence have metaphysical import.  
A number of philosophers and psychologists have distinguished between two ways in which 
we can represent spatial and temporal properties and relations. The distinction has been drawn 
in a number of ways and has been expressed in different terminologies. It is the distinction 
between objective (absolute, non-perspectival, detached, disengaged) and egocentric 
(perspectival, subjective, immersed, engaged indexical) representations. In a nutshell,  
perspectival or egocentric representations are viewpoint-dependent in the sense that the way 
spatial and temporal positions and  relations are represented is relative to one’s own position 
in space or time. In contrast, objective representations are independent of one’s position in 
space or time and thus viewpoint-invariant. For instance, I may represent event A as past or as 
more past than event B (egocentric representations of temporal position and temporal relation, 
respectively) or I may represent event A as occurring on September 11, 2001 and as earlier 
then event B (objective representations of temporal location and temporal relation, 
respectively) And similarly for spatial positions and relations. I can represent object1 A as to 
the right or to the right of object B or I may represent object A as 48° 51' 21" N and 2° 19' 43" 
E or as north of B. Both types of representations are obviously present at the linguistic level 
and presumably it is also the case that we have both egocentric and objective mental 
representations of space and time. It is doubtful whether it would make sense to draw this 
distinction at all levels of mental representations. It may be claimed for instance that certain 
forms of perceptual or motor representations are essentially perspectival or that linguistic and 
perceptual representations cannot be considered as perspectival in exactly the same sense. 
Although these are extremely interesting issues, I will not go into them here.   
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1 In this paper, I will use 'object' as a general term for spatially located entities, including of course objects stricto 
sensu but also features. 
Rather, my main purpose in this paper will be to investigate the relationships between 
egocentric representations (either linguistic or mental) of space and time and objective 
representations thereof. Are the two types of representations independent or not? Is there 
some form of priority of one way of representing over the other and if there is, how is it to be 
understood? Do objective and perspectival representations of time relate in the same way that 
objective and egocentric representations of space do? Are there rather fundamental 
differences in the way we apprehend temporal and spatial properties that disrupt the analogy 
between temporal and spatial thinking?  
In a recent paper Robin Le Poidevin (1999) has tackled these very issues. His main claim is 
that we have objective representations of time and that these do not depend on perspectival 
representations to give them content. Since he takes it for granted that objective spatial 
representations are also independent of egocentric spatial representations, he also claims that 
in this respect, the analogy between space and time holds. Although I agree with Le 
Poidevin's main claim, I think he has perhaps not distinguished clearly enough between 
various versions of the question regarding the possible dependence of objective 
representations on perspectival representations. The notion of dependence can be understood 
in several ways and the dependence or independence claims can be given stronger and weaker 
readings. In the first section, I shall try to disentangle these various readings and to sketch 
their relations. The following two sections will provide fuller characterizations of the 
distinction between egocentric and objective representations, first in the case of space (section 
2) and then in the case of time (section 3). In section 4, I will then examine how the different 
versions of the dependence/independence claims fare with respect to time and to space. I'll 
argue that for some of these claims the analogy between space and time breaks down. My 
purpose will be to try to pin down the reasons why it does. 
 
1. Varieties of Dependence and Independence Claims 
The idea of dependence for representations is the idea that representations of one type are 
constructed from representations of another type. Dependence can be understood in several 
ways, depending on its modal force, on its quantificational force, and on whether it is 
complete or merely partial. Let me here offer some clarifications. First, when I speak of 
modal force, I mean something weaker than the purely logical notions of necessity or 
possibility. Rather, what I have in mind may be termed cognitive necessity or possibility. 
Thus, for instance, the idea that a representation of type X is necessarily a construction from 
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representations of type Y may be rephrased as the idea that given our cognitive make-up, the 
only way we can form a representation of type X is by constructing it from representations of 
type Y. Second, dependence may hold for all tokens of representations of type X or only for 
some. This is one aspect of quantificational force. Third, one may also have either existential 
or universal quantification on representations of type Y. I call the dependence partial when a 
representation of type X is constructed at least  in part from representations of type Y; I call it 
complete, when it is constructed from representations of type Y alone. In what follows, I will 
concentrate more specifically on two readings of the dependence claim: 
(SD) Strong dependence: All representations of type X are, necessarily, 
constructions from representations of type Y alone. 
(WD) Weak dependence: Some representations of type X are, necessarily, constructed 
at least in part from representations of type Y.  
(SD) and (WD) differ in two respects. Their quantificational force is different, with (SD) 
applying to all tokens of type X and (WD) applying only to some. Moreover, in (SD) 
dependence is complete, whereas in (WD) it is only partial. Thus (SD) entails (WD) but not 
conversely. It is also important to note that (SI) is tantamount to the thesis that the meaning of 
representations of type X reduces to the meaning of representations of type Y. Thus, (SD) 
may read as semantic dependence. Note also that (SD) is stronger that the thesis that the truth 
conditions of representations of type X can be fully stated in terms of representations of type 
Y.2 
I will be concerned with three forms of independence claims: 
(SSI)  Super Strong Independence: It is cognitively impossible that all 
representations of type X be constructed from representations of type Y alone.
  
(SI)  Strong Independence: It is not the case that there are representations of type X 
that are, necessarily, constructed at least in part from representations of type Y. 
(WI) Weak Independence: It is not the case that all representations of type X are, 
necessarily, constructions from representations of type Y alone. 
(WI) is the negation of (SD). (SI) in turn is the negation of (WD). (SSI) is the claim that 
representations of type X cannot, given our cognitive make-up, be constructed from 
representations of type Y alone. Both (SSI) and (SI)  are stronger than (WI) and entails it.  But 
(SSI) compatible with the falsity of (SI), for it is in principle possible that no representations 
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2 For instance, Hugh Mellor's (1998) defence of the claim that egocentric temporal sentences (what he calls A-
sentences) have objective truthmakers (B-truthmakers) is not a version of the semantic dependence thesis. 
Indeed, he insists that it would be wrong to infer that "if A-sentences have B-truthmakers, they must mean the 
same as the B-sentences (i.e. objective temporal sentences) which state those truthmakers" (1998: 47).  
of type x can be constructed from representations of type y alone but that some must 
constructed in part form representations of type y. 
Our project is to investigate the relation between objective and egocentric representations. We 
must therefore consider 10 possibilities: 
(OSD) Objective Strong Dependence: All objective representations are, necessarily, 
constructions from egocentric representations alone. 
(OWD) Objective Weak Dependence: Some objective representations are, 
necessarily, constructed at least in part from egocentric representations.  
(OWI) Objective Weak Independence: It is not the case that all objective 
representations are, necessarily, constructions from egocentric representations 
alone. 
(OSI)  Objective Strong Independence: It is not the case that some objective 
representations are, necessarily, constructed at least in part from egocentric 
representations. 
(OSSI) Objective Super Strong Independence: It is cognitively impossible that all 
objective representations be constructed from egocentric representations alone. 
(ESD) Egocentric Strong Dependence: All egocentric representations are necessarily 
constructions from objective representations alone.* 
(EWD) Egocentric Weak Dependence: Some egocentric representations are, 
necessarily, constructed at least in part from objective representations.  
(EWI) Egocentric Weak Independence: It is not the case that all egocentric 
representations are, necessarily, constructions from objective representations 
alone. 
 (ESI)  Egocentric Strong Independence: It is not the case that some egocentric 
representations are, necessarily, constructed at least in part from objective 
representations. 
(ESSI) Egocentric Super Strong Independence: It is cognitively impossible that all 
egocentric representations be constructed from objective representations alone. 
 
Some remarks. First, we can immediately note that (ESSI) is highly plausible for reasons well 
rehearsed in the literature on indexicality. As John Perry (1993) has forcefully argued, 
indexicals are essential in the sense that there can be no non-indexical replacement for 
indexicals in indexical beliefs that preserve the cognitive significance and explanatorily force 
of the original beliefs. Attempts to construct the meaning of indexical sentences or thoughts 
from the meaning of objective sentences or thoughts are therefore doomed to failure as are 
attempts to extract egocentric information from purely objective information. Since (ESSI) 
implies (EWI) and (EWI) in turn is the negation of (ESD), we may set aside in order to 
concentrate on more problematic claims. Note, however, that although it appears wrong to 
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think that we could extract egocentric information from objective information alone, it is quite 
unproblematic to claim that the joint exploitation of objective and egocentric information can 
help us increase our stock of egocentric knowledge. That is what 'you are here' signs on maps 
are for. Looking at a map will not help you find your way if you don't know where you stand 
on the map, nor will the mere thought that you are here help you, since this thought is true 
wherever you are, but the two bits of information put together may be quite useful.  It is 
obvious therefore that some egocentric representations are constructed in part from objective 
representations. It is not obvious however whether some egocentric representations are 
necessarily so constructed, hence the interest of examining (EWD).  
Having set aside (ESD) as false and (EWI) and (ESSI) as both true, we can now devote our 
attention to the seven remaining claims and concentrate on the remaining claims and their 
possible combinations. All combinations of independence claims for objective and egocentric 
representations are obviously consistent and amount to claims of mutual (semantic) 
independence. All combinations of an independence claim with a dependence claim are also 
consistent and amount to one-way dependence, either egocentric or objective. The 
combination of weak dependence claims is also consistent, giving rise to a claim of partial 
mutual dependency. The only combination whose consistency appears problematic is that of 
(OSD) with (EWD). Recall that strong dependency is tantamount to a claim of semantic 
reducibility. But if objective representations were constructed from egocentric representations 
that were themselves dependent on objective representations, we would have circularity. 
Egocentric weak dependence states that some but not all egocentric representations are 
constructed in part from objective representations. We may then divide egocentric 
representations into independent ones and dependent ones. Consistency can be preserved only 
if objective representations are constructed from independent egocentric representations 
alone. If however, the egocentric representations that are needed to construct objective 
representations are dependent ones, (EWD) cannot be maintained consistently with (OSD). 
My aim now will be to investigate which forms of dependence or independence hold for 
space and for time, whether the analogy holds in all cases, and, if it doesn't, what explains its 
disruption. As a preliminary step, I must start by giving a fuller characterisation of the 
distinction between perspectival and objective representations, starting with space. 
2. Egocentric and Objective Representations of Space 
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Egocentric and objective representations of space can be distinguished in terms of their 
context-sensitivity or lack of it and in terms of their differential roles in thought and action. 
Intuitively, egocentric representations are representations that are sensitive to one's 
perspective or viewpoint, one's position in space, whereas objective representations exhibit no 
such sensitivity. One way of specifying this distinction is in terms of the frames of reference 
used to encode spatial positions and relations. Egocentric representations make use of 
egocentric frames of reference. Thus, egocentric representations of space, as described by 
Gareth Evans work as follows: 
The subject conceives himself to be in the centre of space (at its point of origin), with its 
co-ordinates given by the concepts 'up' and 'down', left' and 'right', and 'in front' and 
'behind'. We may call this 'egocentric space', and we may call thinking about spatial 
position in this framework centring on the subject's body 'thinking egocentrically about 
space' (1982: 153-4). 
As pointed out by John Campbell (1994), however, not any way of thinking of the subject will 
do. Egocentric frames of reference are not be thought of as a special case of an object-centred 
frame of reference, one where the object happens to be the subject's body. The notion of an 
egocentric frame of reference here at stake is a primitive psychological notion, not one that 
depends on the prior identification of a body. What gives an egocentric frame of reference its 
significance and makes it irreducible to an object-centred frame of reference, including one 
where the object happens to be ego is its intimate connection to action. Egocentric spatial 
information is immediately action-guiding, whether it be for navigating the environment or 
for interacting with physical objects. As Evans puts it: 
Egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the content of our spatial experiences 
would be formulated, and those in which our immediate behavioural plans would be 
expressed. This duality is no coincidence: an egocentric space can exist only for an 
animal in which  a complex network of connections exists between perceptual input and 
behavioural output. (1982: 154).  
As Evans also points out, a subject may be differentially sensitive to stimuli carrying different 
spatial information without grasping the spatial significance of the stimuli. We have evidence 
that the subject is sensitive to the spatial significance of the stimuli only if differences in 
stimuli are connected in a non-arbitrary manner to differences in spatial behaviour. Evans 
conclusion, not devoid of verificationist overtones, is that egocentric spatial terms 'derive their 
meanings in part from their complicated connections with the subject's actions' (1982: 155).  
It has also been argued, by Evans and many others after him that the content of egocentric 
perceptual representations of space was non-conceptual and that there was no reason to deny 
them to babies and creatures that do not possess concepts of space insofar as they are some 
complex but systematic enough connections between the spatial information contained in 
their perceptual input and their spatial behaviour.  
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Thus, we may say that egocentric representations of space have the following characteristics3: 
 
(1) Egocentric representations of space involve a subject-centred frame of reference. 
This frame of reference is intensional, in the sense that an identification of the 
egocentric position of an object does not rest on a prior identification of the subject's 
body. 
(2) Egocentric spatial terms work like indexicals: the egocentric spatial locations of 
objects vary as the subject moves around in space and thus the reference of a given 
monadic egocentric expression, such as 'to the left' or 'straight ahead' varies 
depending on context. 
(3) Egocentric representations of space are immediately action-guiding. 
(4) Egocentric representations of space do not require the subject to possess concepts of 
space, spatial positions and relations. 
(5) Egocentric spatial representations encode perceptual input. 
(6) The egocentric information provided by perception is not confined to one position: 
objects may occupy various positions in the visual or auditory fields. 
(7) The egocentric information provided by perception is not confined to one spatially 
located object: we can simultaneously perceive several objects occupying various 
locations in the visual or auditory field. 
(8) The egocentric information provided by perception is not confined to locations: we 
can perceive the spatial relations among objects in the visual field. We can see 
object A as being to the left of object B, above it, in front of it, behind it, between 
object B and object C, etc.4 
(9) The subject's behaviour is similarly not confined to one egocentric position.  
                                                     
3 The list I propose includes all items on Le Poidevin's own list, together with several additional items, namely 
(8), (9) and (10). 
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4  Note that the egocentric perceptual representations of spatial relations should be distinguished from spatial 
representations that make use of intrinsic frames of reference, i.e. frames of reference that exploit the intrinsic 
axes of one of the objects present in a visual scene. Thus there are two readings to the sentence "the dog is in 
front of the house". On the egocentric reading, there is a line of sight on which the dog and the house are aligned 
and the dog is closer to the perceiver than the house. On the intrinsic reading, there is an intrinsic frame of 
reference positioned on the house and whose axes exploit its intrinsic geometric or functional features, the house 
has a front and the dog is the region nearing the front. Notice that objects A, B, C, whose spatial relations are 
represented, may be such things as balls, with no salient intrinsic axes and that in such cases only the egocentric 
reading is possible. 
(10) Moreover, the subject can in principle move in any direction and his motions are 
reversible (he can revisit the positions in space he had occupied earlier). This is 
made possible by an important property of space, namely its isotropy. 
By contrast, objective representations of space are non-perspectival in the sense that they do 
not involve intensional egocentric frames or references. They make use of either intrinsic, 
object-centred, frames of reference, or absolute, non-centred, frames of reference. An object-
centred frame of reference may occasionally use the subject's body as its centre, but an 
important difference with an egocentric frame of reference stricto sensu, is that the 
construction of an objective subject-centred frame of reference requires a prior identification 
of the subject's body. A second distinctive feature of objective spatial representations is that 
they typically remain invariant with respect to the subject's movements. This assertion 
requires some qualifications. First, if the subject' position is an element of the objective 
representation and the representation is dynamic, his motion will induce a corresponding 
change in the objective representation. Second, by changing position, the subject may also 
gain access to new spatial information, the exploitation of which may help him update or 
enrich his objective representation. A third characteristic of objective representations is that 
objective spatial information is not immediately action-guiding. As our brief discussion of 
Perry's notion of essential indexicality has already shown, in order to be able to use objective 
spatial information to guide his behaviour, a subject must have bridging egocentric spatial 
information.  
Typical examples of public objective representations are maps, models of objects, anatomical 
drawings, architectural blueprints, etc. There is also strong evidence that there exist mental 
objective representations of space, also known as cognitive maps. In a well-know book, The 
Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map, O'Keefe and Nadel offer powerful arguments in favour of 
the existence of such cognitive maps and their independence from egocentric representations: 
…we think that the concept of absolute space is primary and that its elaboration does 
not depend upon prior notions of relative space… [there] are spaces centred on the eye, 
the head, and the body, all of which can be subsumed under the  heading of egocentric 
space. In addition, there exists at least one neural system which provides the basis for an 
integrated model of the environment. This system underlies the notion of absolute, 
unitary space, which is a non-centred stationary framework through which the organism 
and its egocentric spaces move. (1978: 1-2). 
The neural system in question is the hippocampal system and the authors' hypothesis is that 
the spatial relationships between places in the environment are encoded by populations of 
hippocampal cells. The hippocampal map is used for navigation. In particular, it underlies the 
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ability to use a direct route from A to B, even when one has never before used that route. 
Research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience in the last two decades has yielded a vast 
amount of further experimental evidence supporting the existence of such cognitive maps as 
well as more detailed models of the way spatial information is encoded in the hippocampus5. 
Other evidence, adduced by Le Poidevin, in favour of the existence of an objective cognitive 
map is the fact that we engage in reciprocal communication with subjects who have different 
spatial perspectives and do not share our egocentric perspective. We may for instance give 
directions on the phone to another person on how to reach a certain location. Le Poidevin 
suggests that: "the best explanation of our ability to communicate with others in these 
situations is that we map their positions onto an objective space" (1999: 26). 
 
3. Egocentric and Objective Representations of Time 
It is obvious that at the linguistic level at least we have a distinction between egocentric and 
objective representations of time that parallels the distinction we have for space. Terms like 
'now', 'then', 'past', 'present', 'future', 'yesterday', 'tomorrow' may be thought as temporal 
analogs to egocentric spatial expressions such as 'here', 'there', 'to the right', 'to the left', 'three 
feet down' or 'up'. And a similar parallel goes for objective temporal expressions ('before', 
'after', simultaneous with, at 3 pm GMT on September 11, 2001) and spatial expressions 
('adjacent' 'north of', 'at right angles to', at 48° 51' 21" N and 2° 19' 43" E). 
It is interesting however to compare egocentric spatial with egocentric temporal 
representations. How many of the characteristic features of egocentric spatial representations 
do carry over to temporal representations? 
Features (1), (2), (3) and (4) can be preserved with minor adjustments: 
(1') Egocentric representations of time involve a subject-centred frame of reference. 
This frame of reference is intensional, in the sense that an identification of the 
egocentric position of an event in time does not rest on a prior identification of the 
subject6. 
(2') Egocentric terms work like indexicals: the egocentric temporal locations of events 
vary as the subject moves through time and thus the reference of a given monadic 
egocentric expression, such as 'past' or 'future' varies depending on context. 
(3') Egocentric representations of time are immediately action-guiding. 
                                                     
5 See for instance, Squire (1992) and Redish (1999). 
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6 Note that, as in the case of space, objective representations can also be subject-centred in an extensional sense, 
as in "That happened before I was born". 
(4') Egocentric representations of time do not require the subject to possess concepts of 
time and temporal positions. 
The remaining six features however do not carry over from space to time. Perhaps the most 
crucial disanalogies arises with respect to feature (5), with important consequences for 
features (6) to (9), and to feature (10). Feature (5) of egocentric representations of space – that 
they encode perceptual input – may be rephrased more illuminatingly in the following way: 
the spatial content of perceptual state is encoded in an egocentric frame of reference. Clearly 
then, in the case of space, it is the spatial content of perception that is organized in an 
egocentric way. But it is much more dubious whether and to what extent temporal egocentric 
information is encoded as part of the content of perception rather than tied to the mode itself. 
Is it the case that for each perceptual experience of an event of state of affairs it is part of its 
representational content that the event or state of affairs has a certain egocentric temporal 
position (it is occurring 'now'), or, given that perceptual experiences are always experiences of 
present states of affairs or events, is it simply the case that the temporal egocentric 
information is implicit in the mode of experience? In other words, do we perceive the 
presentness of events (where egocentric temporal information would be part of the content of 
the perceptual experience) or do we simply experience present events? It may be argued that 
at least some perceptual experiences must have temporal content. The perception of music 
and more generally the perception of change are cases in point. It would seem that we could 
not perceptually experience music or change as such without experiencing the relations of 
precedence between events. But, even if we grant that a relation of precedence is perceptually 
represented in such cases, we need not grant that it is represented in egocentric temporal 
terms. It is at best unclear whether it makes sense to say that we see or hear the pastness of 
event A and the presentness of event B. It would seem much more plausible to say that we see 
or hear event B as coming after event A. But then we would have an argument that perception 
encodes temporally objective relations between events rather than temporally egocentric ones. 
Besides, one may well argue that we do not, strictly speaking, perceive precedence, but that 
rather the experience of precedence is a combination of perceptual and memory experience. 
We experience precedence when we link a recent memory of event A and a present perception 
of event B. Whether we adopt the first analysis or the second, the same conclusion ensues, the 
experience of precedence does not require perception (or memory) to have egocentric 
temporal information as part of its representational content. If, as the second analysis 
suggests, the experience of precedence exploits egocentric temporal information, this 
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information is directly associated with the mode (present for perception and past for memory) 
rather than being part of the representational content. Thus, the temporal, disanalogous, 
counterpart of (5) would be something like: 
(5') Egocentric temporal information is tied to the attitude or mode of representing 
(present for perception, past for memory, future for prediction or anticipation) 
rather than being part of the representational content. 
As a result, features (6) to (9) of egocentric representations of space have negative 
counterparts for time: 
(6') The egocentric information provided by perception is confined to one temporal 
position: events can only be perceptually experienced as occurring now.  
It follows from (6') that: 
(7') The egocentric temporal information provided by perception is confined to one 
temporal location: we cannot simultaneously perceive several objects/events 
occupying different temporal egocentric locations.  
And it follows from (7'): 
(8') We cannot perceive egocentric temporal relations among events.  
Given the relations between perception and behaviour, it also follows from (6') that:  
(9') The subject's behaviour is similarly confined to one temporal position. 
Behaviour is always in the present. 
Finally, given the directionality (or asymmetry) of time:  
(10') The subject cannot freely move through time, he can only 'passively' move in 
one direction and cannot therefore revisit previously experienced temporal 
positions. 
(7') and (8') are direct negative counterparts to (7) and (8), but more positive counterparts can 
also be derived from (5'): 
(7'') The egocentric temporal information available to a subject at a time is not 
confined to one temporal position. He can, for instance, simultaneously perceive 
an event, remember another and anticipate a third.  
(8'') The egocentric temporal information available to a subject at a time is not 
confined to position: by combining perception and memory, he can represent 
egocentric temporal relations among events. 
The analogy between objective representations of space and time is much more robust. Like 
objective representations of space, objective representations of time are non-perspectival in 
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the sense that they do not involve intensional egocentric frames or references. They make use 
of either an absolute non-centred frame of reference, as when events are ordered in a series 
according to a relation of succession (or its converse, the relation of precedence) or of an 
event-centred frame of reference (the temporal equivalent of an object-centred spatial 
framework). Calendars, for instance, are typically anchored to some actual or purported event 
(such as the birth of Christ for the Christian calendar, the flight of Mohammed to Medina for 
the Muslin calendar, the first day of the first French Republic for the French revolutionary 
calendar, or, rather commonly in older times, the first day of the reign of a new king). Like 
objective spatial representations, objective temporal representations also remain invariant 
with respect to the subject's own changing position in time. Finally, it is also the case that 
objective temporal representations are not immediately action-guiding. I may believe that I 
should leave my office at 12 am to go to an important meeting, but unless I also believe that it 
is now 12 am, I won't budge. 
Le Poidevin mentions two disanalogies between objective representations of time and space. I 
am not convinced however that these purported disanalogies are really substantial. First, Le 
Poidevin claims that: "Reciprocal communication is not normally possible between subjects 
who have different temporal perspectives – we share a common now. So that there is no need, 
apparently, to reconcile different egocentric times" (1999: 27). This statement can only 
accepted as true, almost by definition, if reciprocal communication is understood in a very 
restrictive way, where participants must communicate face to face, so to speak. But if we 
adopt a less stringent criterion and count an exchange of letters as an instance of reciprocal 
communication, then certainly Le Poidevin's point does not hold. The 'now' of writing is not 
the 'now' of the reading. Reciprocal communication is possible between subjects who do not 
share the same temporal perspective. The different egocentric perspectives of the subjects 
must be reconciled. The common practise of dating letters is one way of solving the problem. 
Indeed, more clearly even than in the case of space, the best way to reconcile different 
egocentric temporal perspectives is by mapping them onto a common objective representation 
of time.  
Le Poidevin describes as follows his second purported asymmetry:  
There is no need to locate events in 'objective time' in order to encode information from 
different temporal perspectives. In contrast, given space's three-dimensionality and lack 
of intrinsic directedness, any attempt to encode different perspectives in a single 
egocentric representation would soon involve inconvenient complexity. (1999: 27). 
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Note first that what Le Poidevin is concerned with here is not the combination of different 
perspectives held by different agents,  but the combination of different perspectives of a 
single agent. Note also that the problem should not be considered only at the linguistic level. 
One obvious difference between linguistic egocentric representations of time and space is that 
tense is in many, but not all languages, heavily grammaticalized. It may well be the case that 
the linguistic integration of different spatial perspectives appears more awkward in part 
because we have grammatical tools for the recursive iteration of tenses but lack those tools for 
the recursive iteration of spatial perspectives. But iteration may be concatenative as well as 
recursive, and here spatial egocentric representations, whether linguistic or not do not seem to 
be at a disadvantage. Think, for instance, of how you would explain to someone how to get 
from your office to the Dean's office in another part of the building. Presumably, you will not 
simply point out to her the egocentric direction of the Dean's office from your own present 
perspective. Instead, you will give her directions such as: Go to the right when you leave my 
office, at the end of the corridor take the stairway, go up one floor, on the landing take the 
corridor in front of you, turn right after the coffee machine and it will be the second door on 
the left. Indeed we could easily construct a language with the means to express this in a 
recursive fashion. Something like: 
Right (up (straight ahead (right (left (here is the dean's office))))) 
would then be a straightforward spatial analogue to Le Poidevin's temporal example: 
It was the case (it is about to be the case that (someone is in tears). 
Of course, there are working memory limitations that make it difficult for us to understand a 
sentence that includes too many recursive steps, but there is no reason to think that the 
memory limitations would be different for spatial and for temporal recursion. It is certainly 
not easy to understand a temporal sentence such as:  
It will be the case (it is the case (it was the case (it is about to be the case that (someone 
is in tears)))) 
Having reviewed the analogies and disanalogies between egocentric and objective 
representations of time and space, it is now time for us to ask what their implications might be 
for the various versions of the dependence or independence thesis. 
 
4. Dependence and independence claims for time and space: does the analogy hold? 
As I argued in section 1, egocentric representations are indexical representations and the 
meaning of indexical thoughts is irreducible to the meaning of non-indexical thoughts. 
Therefore, if some form of strong dependence (i.e. semantic dependence)  holds, it can only 
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be a form of objective dependence (OSD), i.e. dependence of objective representations on 
egocentric ones. Moreover, the claim that objective spatial representations are strongly 
dependent  on egocentric spatial expressions appears quite implausible. If O'Keefe and Nadel 
are right, objective cognitive maps of the environment need not be constructed from 
egocentric representations. The only strong dependence claim worth examining is therefore 
the claim that objective representations of time strongly depend on egocentric representations 
of time. Although, Le Poidevin does not explicitly distinguish between the various forms of 
dependence I identified in section 1, it is clear that this claim is his main target. Using the 
distinctions from section 1, we can also redescribe his argumentative strategy as follows. Le 
Poidevin proceeds to undermine (OSD) by arguing that it presupposes a thoroughly 
implausible conception of human time memory and that, if anything, experimental evidence 
on the nature of human time memory supports a form of egocentric weak dependence (EWD) 
incompatible with (OSD). Of course, the falsity of (OSD) amounts to the truth of (OWI). 
Since Le Poidevin thinks that ESD is also unsupported (hence that (EWI holds), he concludes 
that the analogy between time and space holds with respect to semantic independence. Let me 
now examine his main argument for the independence of objective temporal representations 
more closely. Since I think the argument is sound, my purpose in so doing is simply to get 
clearer as to the exact form of egocentric dependence the experimental data he adduces are 
evidence for. 
A number of philosophers hold the view that time is essentially tensed, hence essentially 
egocentric (Lucas, 1973; Prior, 1967; Dummett, 1960; Geach, 1979). Their problem is to 
reconcile this view with the existence of apparently objective representations of time, such as 
'x is earlier than y'. To effect this conciliation, they must show that all purported objective 
temporal expressions are analysable in terms of tensed, egocentric expressions.  
Le Poidevin starts by showing that all but one of the various reductive analyses that have been 
proposed in the literature are defective and exhibit some form of circularity (i.e. the right-
hand side contains hidden objective time specifications). He then proceeds to show that the 
one remaining analysis entails a particular thesis about time memory and that this thesis is 
quite implausible. 
The analysis is as follows:  
(A) x is earlier than y if and only if x is n units past and y is n units past, and n>m, or x is 
v units future and y is w units future, and v<w. 
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What Le Poidevin points out is that in those cases where both x and y are past, as when one 
remembers meeting Claudia before meeting Terence, (A) implies that the memo
representation 'I met Claudia before I met Terence' must be built from two egocentric memory 
representations: 'I met Claudia n units ago' and 'I met Terence m units ago'. The thesis about 
memory forced on us by (A) is then that memory is irreducibly egocentric and involves 
dynamically keeping track of how long ago an event occurred. Of the models of time memory 
that have been proposed in the literature the only one that seems compatible with this view is 
the model known as the strength model. The idea is that from the moment a memory trace is 
formed, it decays, so that we can judge the age of a memory from the strength of the trace. 
However, it is also known that there are serious problems with this model. The strength and 
the rate of decay of a memory trace is not a function just of its age but also of the saliency of 
the remembered event (where saliency itself is a function of many factors). For instance, it 
may be presumed that my memory of what I had for breakfast yesterday morning will fade 
more rapidly than my memory of my being hit by a car on that same day. Le Poidevin 
contrasts the strength model with another model, the inference model, better supported by 
experimental data. According to this latter model, the date of an event is not read off from the 
memory of it, but is inferred from other information, specifically information about the 
relations between this event and other events whose time or date are known. For instance, the 
reason why I can say that I met Claudia before I met Terence may be that I remember meeting 
Claudia in Venice, I remember that my last trip to Venice was in 1996, I remember meeting 
Terence just after I broke my arm and I remember that I broke my arm on Christmas Eve 
1998. As Poidevin stresses, the interesting thing about this model is that it suggests both that 
objective information is being used to generate egocentric information, rather than vice-versa 
and that we have a way of storing objective temporal information that is not simply a 
derivation from egocentric information.  
To sum up, then, Le Poidevin's argument is the following. A defence of (OSD) for time 
requires, among other things, that objective representations of the precedence relations among 
past events A and B be constructed from egocentric representations of how long ago A 
occurred and how long ago B occurred.  But these representations are in turn constructed in 
part from objective representations of the time of some other events A and B are related to. In 
other words, some of the egocentric representations needed to construct objective 
representations must therefore be constructed themselves in part from objective 
representations. Therefore, (OSD) is false and (OWI) holds.  
Le Poidevin's argument is aimed against a purported disanalogy between space and time, 
namely that objective representations of time are strongly (or semantically) dependent on 
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egocentric representations, whereas objective representations of space are not so dependent. 
Note, however, that his argument opens the way for another possible disanalogy. It exploits 
the idea that there is some form of dependence of egocentric representations of time on 
objective representations. But does such a dependence also hold for space? If it doesn't, we 
have a disanalogy.  
As we have just seen, Le Poidevin suggests that evidence in favour of the inference model of 
time memory is also evidence that a certain form of epistemic dependence of egocentric 
representations of time on objective ones holds. Let me start by making it clearer what form 
of dependence the experimental data he adduces are evidence for. First, note that the inference 
model is used to explain not all egocentric representations, but only representations of how 
long ago an event occurred. There is no need to appeal to this model to explain how 
representations that something is past, present or future are generated. We may judge that an 
event is past, present or future simply on the basis of the mode under which the representation 
of the event is entertained (perception, memory, prevision). So we are concerned only with 
what we may call representations of egocentric temporal dating (how long ago something 
occurred).  Second, note also that Le Poidevin does not claim that the strength model lacks all 
validity, but simply that it cannot constitute a general account of time memory. In some 
instances at least, the inference model does a better job at explaining time memory. Simple 
judgments of pastness do not depend on objective temporal information and it is not the case 
that objective information is used to generate all representations of egocentric temporal 
dating. It appears therefore that the evidence in favour of the inference model of time memory 
can only be evidence for a weak dependence of egocentric representations of time (EWD) and 
not for a strong dependence (ESD).  
The question we must now therefore consider is whether (EWD) also holds for space. In other 
words, is it the case that some egocentric representations of space must be constructed in part 
from objective representations? I have already pointed out in section 1 that the joint 
exploitation of egocentric and objective spatial information may yield new egocentric 
information. But couldn't this new egocentric information be obtained from egocentric 
sources alone?  
The way I will proceed is by asking which features of egocentric representations of time are 
responsible for (EWD) and whether the parallel holds for space. One crucial disanalogy 
between egocentric representations of time and space is that egocentric temporal information 
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is encoded in the mode of representing rather than in the content of the representations. But 
the only reliable egocentric temporal information we can extract from modes is whether an 
event is past, present or future. Given the equivocity of trace strength information, 
information about the relative pastness of two events cannot reliably be extracted from 
egocentric temporal information alone and we must therefore resort to objective temporal 
information, information that can be encoded in the content of representations. This situation 
is to be contrasted with the situation that holds for space, where spatial information is part of 
the content of representations and where the spatial information perception carries is neither 
confined to one position in the perceptual field nor to positions alone. In other words, 
egocentric spatial representations encode as part of their content information about spatial 
relations among objects. To sum up, the reasons why (EWD) holds for time have to do with 
features specific to egocentric temporal representations. We don't therefore have parallel 
reasons for claiming that (EWD) also holds for space.  
It may be objected, however, that there may be other reasons why (EWD) should hold for 
space as well. It may well be, for instance, that we do not now simultaneously perceive both 
A and B. For instance, A, and its egocentric position may be the object of our present 
perception, B and its egocentric position the object of an earlier perception. How can we form 
a representation of the spatial egocentric relations of A and B, relative say, to our present 
perspective? Is B, say, to the right of A or to its left? Couldn't it be the case that, on some 
occasions at least, we must use objective information to generate this egocentric information? 
There are two reasons why we may answer this question in the negative. First, we may take 
advantage of the fact that perceptual representations contain information not just about 
positions but also about spatial relations. Admittedly, in the case at hand, we have no 
perception that contains spatial information about both A and B. But it may well be that we 
have representations of the egocentric spatial relation of A to other objects and similarly for B 
and that an egocentric representation of the relations between A and B may be constructed 
from these egocentric representations. The objector again: your having a perceptual 
representation of A as to the right of C and a memory representation of B as to the left of C 
does not allow you to infer that B is to the right of A from your present perspective, for this 
perspective might be different from the perspective your memory is encoded from. The 
question now becomes: can the fact that two representations are encoded from the same 
perspective be established from egocentric information alone? The answer is a qualified yes: 
Yes, provided that each representations encode the egocentric spatial relations among three 
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objects. If I have a perceptual representation of the relative positions of A, C and D and a 
memory representation of the relative position of B, C and D, then if the egocentric spatial 
relation between C and D is the same in the two representations, the perspective is the same 
and the egocentric spatial relations between A and B can be worked out. It may finally be 
objected that the chain of representations linking A to B may be quite long and involve a 
number of intermediary links, making the required calculations long and impractical. One 
answer to that is that long and impractical is not the same as impossible. A second answer is 
that, anyhow, we have another way to find out whether B is to the right of A. Here the recipe 
is quite simple and exploits the direct link between perception and action: move to the right of 
A and look whether you find B. Once again, what we are exploiting here is a crucial 
disanalogy between egocentric representations of time and space. A subject can freely move 
through space and change is spatial perspective, but he can only be passively moved in one 
temporal direction. There seem therefore not to be any good reason why (EWD) should hold 
for space. We have therefore one disanalogy between temporal and spatial representations 
with respect to dependence: (EWD) holds for time; it doesn't for space.  
The last dependence claim we must consider is (OWD). Are there reasons to think that it 
holds for time? For space? 
To answer these questions, we may consider one last time and from a slightly different angle 
why (EWD) holds for time in order to see whether they are analogous reasons to think 
(OWD) holds. The basic problem with egocentric temporal information is that a classification 
of events as past, present or future on the basis of the mode under which we represent them 
does not suffice for a complete egocentric temporal ordering of these events. If you have 
information that A is past and B present you can order them temporally. But if you have 
information that A is past and that B is past, you have not enough information to order them, 
and similarly for future events. What is therefore needed for a complete egocentric temporal 
ordering is information about relative pastness or futurity. What we have seen, in the case of 
the past, is that to get this kind of egocentric information, say that A is more past than B, we 
must typically exploit objective temporal information. Hence (EWD). But no such problem 
arises when one considers the objective temporal ordering of events. A complete temporal 
ordering can be achieved through the use of the 'earlier than' (or, equivalently, 'later than') 
relation alone. It seems therefore that no case can arise where objective temporal information 
need be constructed in part from egocentric temporal information. The same reasoning applies 
to space. A complete objective spatial ordering can be obtained from information about 
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objective spatial relations alone. Hence (OWD) doesn't hold for time and it doesn't for space 
either.  
To sum up, our examination of the various dependence claims yields the following 
conclusion. The analogy between time and space appears robust except for (EWD) that holds 
for time but not for space.  
Let us now consider the independence claims that are yet undecided. Two of the three 
independence claims that were introduced in section 1 are simply negations of corresponding 
dependence claims. (WI) is the negation of (SD) and (SI) is the negation of (WD). Moreover, 
we have seen in section 1 that (ESSI) was highly likely for both space and time and that 
therefore the weaker thesis (EWI) should hold for both space and time. Some of our 
conclusions about dependence from the previous section can also be rephrased as results 
about independence. With respect to time, we have reached the following conclusions: 
(EWD) holds but neither do (OSD) nor (OWD). It follows that (ESI) doesn't hold, but that 
both (OWI) and (OSI) do. In other words, egocentric and objective representations of time are 
mutually weakly independent. Neither kind of representation reduces to the other. On the side 
of space, we reached the conclusion that neither (OSD) nor (OWD) nor (EWD)  hold. It 
follows that (OWI), (OSI) and (ESI) all hold. The only question that remains open is therefore 
that of super strong independence for objective representations (OSSI), the claim that it is 
cognitively impossible that all objective representations be constructed from egocentric 
representations alone.   
 Let me start with time. Claiming that (OSSI) holds for time amounts to claiming that it 
is cognitively impossible to construct a complete objective temporal ordering of events from 
egocentric temporal information alone. By a complete objective ordering7, I mean an ordering 
such that for any pair of represented events, A and B, we can say whether A is earlier than B, 
simultaneous with B, or later than B. By contrast, a complete egocentric ordering is one that 
involves an egocentric frame of reference, with 'now' as its origin and axes labelled past and 
future, and that is such that for any two events lying in the same direction, it is possible to say 
which one is closer to the origin.  We can now be more precise. To claim that (OSSI) holds is 
to claim that it is impossible to derive a complete objective temporal ordering from an 
independent complete egocentric ordering. There can be two different reasons why this 
derivation is impossible and thus why (OSSI) holds. First, it may be that there is no such thing 
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7 Note that I am not using the notion of complete ordering in the strictly mathematical sense, for I allow for the 
possibility that two different events occupy the same temporal position.  
as an independent egocentric temporal ordering, because such an ordering can only be 
achieved through the use of objective temporal information. Second, it may be that although 
such an egocentric ordering exists, the relation(s) in terms of which it is defined are somehow 
incommensurable with the relation(s) that define(s)  an objective ordering, or, to put it 
otherwise the egocentric frame of reference used for the egocentric ordering is somehow 
incommensurable with the objective framework used for the objective temporal ordering. 
Once the question whether (OSSI) holds is stated in those terms, it is easy to see that we 
already have an answer to it. In our discussion of (EWD), we have argued that the reason it 
holds for time is that a complete egocentric temporal ordering could not be achieved without 
using objective information. Thus (OSSI) holds for the first of the two possible reasons just 
mentioned.  
Last but not least, let us consider (OSSI) for space. Here again, (OSSI) can be reformulated in 
terms of ordering. It claims that it is impossible to derive a complete objective spatial ordering 
of spatial entities from an egocentric one. An egocentric spatial ordering is one that involves 
an egocentric frame of reference and is such that, for any two spatial objects A and B and any 
of the egocentric axes, we can say whether A lies closer to the origin than B on that axis or 
not. An objective ordering is one that involves either an object-centred or an absolute frame of 
reference and that is such that for any two spatial entities and any axis, we can say what the 
relative positions of A and B are on that axis. Once again, (OSSI) may hold for two reasons. 
Either there exists no independent egocentric spatial ordering or, if there is, the egocentric and 
objective frames of reference are in a sense incommensurable. I have already argued that it is 
possible to construct a complete egocentric spatial ordering independently of objective 
information. This was my main reason for rejecting (EWD) for space. So if (OSSI) holds, it 
can only be for the second reason. Is it the case then that egocentric spatial frames of 
reference are somehow incommensurable with objective ones.  
To see why some people may think there is incommensurability, a comparison with time will 
once again be useful. Note that given the one-dimensionality and directionality of time, 
possible egocentric frames of reference are highly constrained. The only possible difference 
between various egocentric temporal frames of reference is a difference in the position of the 
origin, i.e. 'now'. The temporal axis and its labels remain invariant; they are always positioned 
in the same way. If there were independent complete egocentric orderings of events, 
converting them into an objective ordering would therefore be a simple affair. It would be 
enough to get rid of the origin, that is, abstract away from it. Now the situation with respect to 
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space appears much more complex. Space is three-dimensional, isotropic and we can move 
freely through it. Thus, egocentric spatial frames of reference may differ in the position of the 
origins, in the direction of the axes and in their labelling. Suppose I am standing still, my 
perceptual input will be encoded in terms of an egocentric frame of reference centred on my 
body and whose axes correspond to my bodily axes ('up', 'down', 'left',' right', 'in front', 
'behind'). If I now move one step ahead, the frame of reference will change in one way: the 
origin will be different, but the axes and their labels will remain the same. Suppose that 
instead of moving one step ahead, I rotate by 180°. In that case the origin remains the same, 
so do the axes, but the labels of two of them are inverted, 'in front' becomes 'behind' and 'right' 
becomes 'left'. Finally, imagine I rotate by 43°, now the axes also change. And since we can 
combine rotation and translation, two egocentric perspectives may differ on all three respects. 
The constraints on temporal egocentric perspectives make it impossible to have two 
perspectives that differ in that, according to one, event A is past and event B is future (or A is 
more past than B) while, according to the other, event A is future and event B is past (or B is 
more past than A). It is easy therefore to see how objective temporal relations could be 
mapped on egocentric temporal relations and properties. But take space, the object A that is to 
the right of B from a certain perspective may well be to the left of B from a second 
perspective, above B from a third one, behind B from a fourth one, and so on. Now, how do 
you map objective spatial relations on egocentric ones? The feeling of hopelessness is here 
probably at the root of the idea that egocentric and objective spatial frames of reference are 
incommensurable.  
In the case of space, trying to derive an objective ordering from an objective one through a 
mapping of objective relations onto egocentric ones is a strategy doomed to failure, but it is 
not the only move open to us. With space, we have resources that we lack for time. In 
particular, features (7) and (8) of egocentric spatial representations come in very handy. The 
spatial egocentric information provided by perception is not confined to one object and it is 
not confined to locations. In other words, we can simultaneously perceive several objects 
occupying various locations in the visual or auditory field and we can perceive the spatial 
relations among them. This gives us the necessary ingredients for the definition of an 
objective frame of reference. An objective frame of reference may dispense with an origin (it 
need not have a centre), but it requires a set of axes, together with a way of distinguishing the 
two ends of each axes (we may call that a labelling system, although obviously language is 
not required). Now, the recipe is quite simple, use the spatial relations among some objects or 
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among the parts of an object to define and label axes. We may call anchors the objects so 
used. You now have an objective frame of reference and can use it to represent the positions 
of other objects and relations among them. For this recipe to work, a little cooperation from 
the world is needed: there must be either one stable enduring non-symmetrical object or 
several enduring discriminable objects or features in a stable configuration to serve as anchors 
for a set of labelled axes. (Note that, anyway, objective spatial representations would be of no 
great use, if space was either a barren solitude or a complete chaos.) Once this frame of 
reference has been built, any complete egocentric spatial ordering, whatever the perspective it 
is from, can be converted into an objective spatial ordering. For each perspective, the 
egocentric representation of the relations among anchors tells you what the mapping should 
be. Our final conclusion regarding (OSSI) is therefore that it doesn't hold for space. 
 
 Space Time 
Objective Strong Dependence (OSD) N N 
Objective Weak Dependence (OWD) N N 
Objective Weak Independence (OWI) Y Y 
Objective Strong Independence (OSI) Y Y 
Objective Super Strong Independence (OSSI) N Y 
Egocentric Strong Dependence (ESD) N N 
Egocentric Weak Dependence (EWD) N Y 
Egocentric Weak Independence (EWI) Y Y 
Egocentric Strong Independence (ESI) Y N 
Egocentric Super Strong Independence (ESSI) Y Y 
 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1 recapitulates the results of this investigation of dependence/independence. We have 
found two main disanalogies between temporal and spatial representations. First, egocentric 
temporal representations are weakly dependent on objective representations, but not so for 
egocentric spatial relations. Second, objective temporal representations are super strongly 
independent of egocentric ones, whereas this super strong independence does hold for space. 
In both cases, the reason why the analogy breaks down have to do with differences between 
egocentric representations of time and egocentric representations of space. Three differences 
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play a crucial role. First egocentric spatial information is encoded as part of the content of 
egocentric spatial representations whereas egocentric temporal information is associated with 
the mode not the content of egocentric representations. Second, the spatial egocentric 
information provided by perception is not confined to one object and it is not confined to 
locations but can be about spatial relations among objects (other than the perceiver). Third, a 
subject can in principle move in any direction in space and his motions are reversible, 
whereas he can only passively move in time in one direction.  
Let me offer two final thoughts. First, it is worth pointing that ultimately, these disanalogies 
are a consequence of our cognitive make-up. For suppose for instance that our time memory 
worked according to different principles, Suppose that all memories had initially traces of the 
same strength and that the rate of decay of the traces was a function of time only. The strength 
model would then be an adequate model of time memory and the 'more past than' could be 
defined in a purely egocentric may. This means that (EWD) would cease to hold. Note, in 
particular, that the 'more future than' relation could be defined using the 'more past than' 
relation and this in the following way: x is more future than y if and only if it will be the case 
that y is more past than x. Thus, an independent complete egocentric temporal ordering of 
events could be constructed and (OSSI) would also cease to hold. In other words, a complete 
analogy would be restored. Given that it could be restored as a result of a simple change in 
cognitive make-up, the disanalogy appears to be merely a matter of cognitive necessity, i.e. to 
be necessary only with respect to our particular cognitive make-up. Finally, it may seem 
somewhat strange that a mere change in the workings of time memory would suffice to 
restore a complete analogy between the way egocentric and objective representations relate in 
the case of space and in the case of time. There would still be disanalogies between egocentric 
temporal representations and allocentric ones, in particular regarding features (6)-(10) vs. (6')-
(10'). Why is it then that such local disanalogies have no global effects? The answer lies, I 
think, in the fact that certain differences in features counterbalance others.  The relation 
between egocentric and objective spatial representations is more complex than for temporal 
representations insofar as the represented space is 3D and non-oriented and thus allows for a 
huge range of different perspectives. Yet, the fact that perception is not confined to one 
egocentric position but encodes as part of its content egocentric information on the positions 
of objects in the perceptual fields and on the spatial relations among these objects together 
with the fact together with the fact that we can move freely through space compensate for this 
complexity. Conversely, the relation between egocentric and objective representations of 
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space is rather simple insofar as egocentric represented time is one-dimensional and oriented. 
Yet, perception does not yield information about egocentric temporal relations and thus it is 
not easier to work out the relations between egocentric and objective temporal representations 
than to work out those relations for space.  
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